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A part of the Intel AMT web management interface, accessible even when the computer is sleeping Intel Active Management Technology ( AMT) is hardware and firmware technology for remote of, running on the, a separate microprocessor not exposed to the user, in order to monitor, maintain, update, upgrade, and repair them. (OOB) or hardware-based management is different from software-based (or ) management and software management agents. Hardware-based management works at a different level from software applications, and uses a communication channel (through the stack) that is different from software-based communication (which is through the software stack in the operating system).
Hardware-based management does not depend on the presence of an OS or locally installed management agent. Hardware-based management has been available on Intel/AMD based computers in the past, but it has largely been limited to auto-configuration using or for dynamic IP address allocation and, as well as (WOL) for remotely powering on systems. AMT is not intended to be used by itself; it is intended to be used with a software management application. It gives a management application (and thus, the system administrator who uses it) access to the PC down the wire, in order to remotely do tasks that are difficult or sometimes impossible when working on a PC that does not have remote functionalities built into it.
Application Programming Interface for the AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client. The API package contains documentation, source files, and library files to support a C++ interface for the Cisco AnyConnect VPN Client. You can use the libraries and example programs for building on Windows, Linux and MAC platforms.
AMT is designed into a secondary (service) processor located on the motherboard, and uses -secured communication and strong to provide additional security. AMT is built into PCs with technology and is based on the (ME). AMT has moved towards increasing support for (DASH) standards and AMT Release 5.1 and later releases are an implementation of DASH version 1.0/1.1 standards for out-of-band management.
AMT provides similar functionality to, although AMT is designed for client computing systems as compared with the typically server-based IPMI. Currently, AMT is available in desktops, servers, ultrabooks, tablets, and laptops with Intel Core processor family, including Intel Core i5, i7, and Intel Xeon processor E3-1200 product family. Intel confirmed a Remote Elevation of Privilege bug (CVE-2017-5689, SA-00075) in its Management Technology on May 1, 2017. Every Intel platform with either Intel Standard Manageability, Active Management Technology, or Small Business Technology, from in 2008 to in 2017 has a remotely exploitable security hole in the ME. Some manufacturers, like and System76 are already selling hardware with Intel Management Engine disabled to prevent the remote exploit.
Additional major security flaws in the ME affecting a very large number of computers incorporating Management Engine, and firmware, from in 2015 to in 2017, were confirmed by Intel on November 20, 2017 (SA-00086). Contents.
Non-free service access Although iAMT may be included for free in devices sold to the public and to small businesses, the full capabilities of iAMT, including encrypted remote access via a and automatic remote device provisioning of unconfigured iAMT clients, are not accessible for free to the general public or to the direct owners of iAMT equipped devices. IAMT cannot be fully utilized to its maximum potential without purchasing additional software or management services from Intel or another (ISV) or (VAR). Intel itself provides a developer's toolkit software package which allows basic access to iAMT, but is not intended to be normally used to access the technology. Only basic modes of access are supported, without full access to the encrypted communications of the complete purchased management system. Features Intel AMT includes hardware-based remote management, security, power management, and remote configuration features that enable independent remote access to AMT-enabled PCs. Intel AMT is security and management technology that is built into PCs with.
Intel AMT uses a hardware-based (OOB) communication channel that operates regardless of the presence of a working operating system. The communication channel is independent of the PC's power state, the presence of a management agent, and the state of many hardware components such as. Most AMT features are available OOB, regardless of PC power state.
Other features require the PC to be powered up (such as console redirection via (SOL), agent presence checking, and network traffic filtering). Intel AMT has remote power-up capability.
Hardware-based features can be combined with scripting to automate maintenance and service. Hardware-based AMT features on laptop and desktop PCs include:.
Encrypted, remote communication channel for between the IT console and Intel AMT. Ability for a wired PC (physically connected to the network) outside the company's on an open to establish a secure communication tunnel (via AMT) back to the IT console. Examples of an open LAN include a wired laptop at home or at an SMB site that does not have a proxy server. Remote power up / power down / power cycle through encrypted. Remote, via integrated device electronics redirect (IDE-R).
Console redirection, via (SOL). Hardware-based filters for monitoring headers in inbound and outbound network traffic for known threats (based on programmable ), and for monitoring known / unknown threats based on time-based. Laptops and desktop PCs have filters to monitor packet headers. Desktop PCs have packet-header filters and time-based filters. Isolation circuitry (previously and unofficially called 'circuit breaker' by Intel) to port-block, or fully isolate a PC that might be compromised or infected.
Agent presence checking, via hardware-based, policy-based programmable. A 'miss' generates an event; and this can also generate an alert.
OOB alerting. Persistent event log, stored in protected memory (not on the hard drive).
Access (preboot) the PC's universal unique identifier (UUID). Access (preboot) hardware asset information, such as a component's manufacturer and model, which is updated every time the system goes through (POST). Access (preboot) to third-party data store (TPDS), a protected memory area that software vendors can use, in which to version information,.DAT files, and other information. Remote configuration options, including certificate-based zero-touch remote configuration, USB key configuration (light-touch), and manual configuration. for playback protection of -protected media.
Laptops with AMT also include wireless technologies:. Support for // protocols.compatible extensions for History. Main article: Software updates provide upgrades to the next minor version of Intel AMT.
New major releases of Intel AMT are built into a new, and are updated through new hardware. Applications Almost all AMT features are available even if the PC is in a powered-off state but with its power cord attached, if the operating system has crashed, if the software agent is missing, or if hardware (such as a hard drive or memory) has failed. The console-redirection feature , agent presence checking, and network traffic filters are available after the PC is powered up.
Intel AMT supports these management tasks:. Remotely power up, power down, power cycle, and power reset the computer. Remote boot the PC by remotely redirecting the PC's process, causing it to boot from a different image, such as a, bootable or, remediation drive, or other boot device. This feature supports remote booting a PC that has a corrupted or missing OS. Remotely redirect the system's I/O via console redirection through (SOL). This feature supports remote troubleshooting, remote repair, software upgrades, and similar processes.
Access and change settings remotely. This feature is available even if PC power is off, the OS is down, or hardware has failed. This feature is designed to allow remote updates and corrections of configuration settings.
This feature supports full BIOS updates, not just changes to specific settings. Detect suspicious network traffic. In laptop and desktop PCs, this feature allows a sys-admin to define the events that might indicate an inbound or outbound threat in a network header. In desktop PCs, this feature also supports detection of known and/or unknown threats (including slow- and fast-moving ) in network traffic via time-based, -based filters. Network traffic is checked before it reaches the OS, so it is also checked before the OS and software applications load, and after they shut down (a traditionally vulnerable period for PCs ). Block or to and from systems suspected of being infected or compromised by, computer worms, or other threats.
This feature uses Intel AMT hardware-based isolation circuitry that can be triggered manually (remotely, by the sys-admin) or automatically, based on IT policy (a specific event). Manage hardware in the on-board.
Automatically send OOB communication to the IT console when a critical software agent misses its assigned check in with the programmable, policy-based hardware-based. A 'miss' indicates a potential problem. This feature can be combined with OOB alerting so that the IT console is notified only when a potential problem occurs (helps keep the network from being flooded by unnecessary 'positive' event notifications). Receive Platform Event Trap (PET) events out-of-band from the AMT subsystem (for example, events indicating that the OS is hung or crashed, or that a has been attempted). An alert can be issued on an event (such as falling out of compliance, in combination with agent presence checking) or on a threshold (such as reaching a particular fan speed). Access a persistent event log, stored in protected memory.
The event log is available OOB, even if the OS is down or the hardware has already failed. Discover an AMT system independently of the PC's power state or OS state. Discovery (preboot access to the ) is available if the system is powered down, its OS is compromised or down, hardware (such as a or ) has failed, or management agents are missing. Perform a software inventory or access information about on the PC. This feature allows a third-party software vendor to store software asset or version information for local applications in the Intel AMT protected memory. (This is the protected third party data store, which is different from the protected AMT memory for hardware component information and other system information). The third-party data store can be accessed OOB by the sys-admin.
For example, an could store version information in the protected memory that is available for third-party data. A could use this feature to identify PCs that need to be updated. Perform a hardware inventory by uploading the remote PC's hardware asset list (platform, disks, portable batteries, field replaceable units, and other information). Hardware asset information is updated every time the system runs through (POST).
From major version 6, Intel AMT embeds a proprietary, for out-of-band access using dedicated VNC-compatible viewer technology, and have full KVM (keyboard, video, mouse) capability throughout the power cycle – including uninterrupted control of the desktop when an operating system loads. Clients such as VNC Viewer Plus from also provide additional functionality that might make it easier to perform (and watch) certain Intel AMT operations, such as powering the computer off and on, configuring the BIOS, and mounting a remote image (IDER).
Provisioning and integration AMT supports -based or -based remote provisioning (full remote deployment), provisioning ('one-touch' provisioning), manual provisioning and provisioning using an agent on the local host ('Host Based Provisioning'). An OEM can also pre-provision AMT. The current version of AMT supports remote deployment on both laptop and desktop PCs. (Remote deployment was one of the key features missing from earlier versions of AMT and which delayed acceptance of AMT in the market.) Remote deployment, until recently, was only possible within a corporate network. Remote deployment lets a sys-admin deploy PCs without 'touching' the systems physically.
It also allows a sys-admin to delay deployments and put PCs into use for a period of time before making AMT features available to the IT console. As delivery and deployment models evolve, AMT can now be deployed over the Internet, using both 'Zero-Touch' and Host-Based methods. PCs can be sold with AMT enabled or disabled. The determines whether to ship AMT with the capabilities ready for setup (enabled) or disabled. The setup and configuration process may vary depending on the OEM build. AMT includes a Privacy Icon application, called IMSS, that notifies the system's user if AMT is enabled. It is up to the OEM to decide whether they want to display the icon or not.
AMT supports different methods for disabling the management and security technology, as well as different methods for reenabling the technology. AMT can be partially unprovisioned using the Configuration Settings, or fully unprovisioned by erasing all configuration settings, security credentials, and operational and networking settings. A partial unprovisioning leaves the PC in the setup state. In this state, the PC can self-initiate its automated, remote configuration process.
A full unprovisioning erases the configuration profile as well as the security credentials and operational / networking settings required to communicate with the Intel Management Engine. A full unprovisioning returns Intel AMT to its factory default state. Once AMT is disabled, in order to enable AMT again, an authorized sys-admin can reestablish the security credentials required to perform remote configuration by either:. Using the remote configuration process (full automated, remote config via certificates and keys).
Physically accessing the PC to restore security credentials, either by USB key or by entering the credentials and MEBx parameters manually. There is a way to totally reset AMT and return in to factory defaults. This can be done in two ways:. Setting the appropriate value in the. Clearing the and /. Setup and integration of AMT is supported by a setup and configuration service (for automated setup), an AMT Webserver tool (included with Intel AMT), and AMT Commander, an unsupported and free, proprietary application available from the Intel website. Communication All access to the Intel AMT features is through the Intel Management Engine in the PC's hardware and firmware.
AMT communication depends on the state of the Management Engine, not the state of the PC's OS. As part of the Intel Management Engine, the AMT OOB communication channel is based on the stack designed into system hardware. Because it is based on the TCP/IP stack, remote communication with AMT occurs via the network data path before communication is passed to the OS. Intel AMT supports wired and networks. For wireless notebooks on battery power, OOB communication is available when the system is awake and connected to the corporate network, even if the OS is down. OOB communication is also available for wireless or wired notebooks connected to the corporate network over a host OS-based (VPN) when notebooks are awake and working properly.
AMT version 4.0 and higher can establish a secure communication tunnel between a wired PC and an IT console outside the corporate firewall. In this scheme, a management presence server (Intel calls this a 'vPro-enabled gateway') authenticates the PC, opens a secure TLS tunnel between the IT console and the PC, and mediates communication. The scheme is intended to help the user or PC itself request maintenance or service when at satellite offices or similar places where there is no on-site or management appliance. Technology that secures communications outside a corporate is relatively new.
It also requires that an be in place, including support from IT consoles and firewalls. An AMT PC stores system configuration information in protected memory. For PCs version 4.0 and higher, this information can include the name(s) of appropriate ' management servers for the company.
When a user tries to initiate a remote session between the wired PC and a company server from an open, AMT sends the stored information to a management presence server (MPS) in the 'demilitarized zone' ('DMZ') that exists between the corporate firewall and client (the user PC's) firewalls. The MPS uses that information to help the PC. The MPS then mediates communication between the laptop and the company's management servers. Because communication is authenticated, a secure communication tunnel can then be opened using encryption.
Once secure communications are established between the IT console and Intel AMT on the user's PC, a sys-admin can use the typical AMT features to remotely diagnose, repair, maintain, or update the PC. Design Hardware. Main article: The Management Engine (ME) is an isolated and protected coprocessor, embedded as a non-optional part in all current (as of 2015 ) Intel chipsets. Starting with ME 11, it is based on the x86-based 32-bit CPU and runs the operating system. The ME state is stored in a partition of the, using the (EFFS). Previous versions were based on an, with the Management Engine running the from.
Versions 1.x to 5.x of the ME used the ARCTangent-A4 (32-bit only instructions) whereas versions 6.x to 8.x used the newer ARCompact (mixed 32- and 16-bit ). Starting with ME 7.1, the ARC processor could also execute signed. The ME has its own MAC and IP address for the out-of-band interface, with direct access to the Ethernet controller; one portion of the Ethernet traffic is diverted to the ME even before reaching the host's operating system, for what support exists in various Ethernet controllers, exported and made configurable via (MCTP). The ME also communicates with the host via PCI interface.
Under Linux, communication between the host and the ME is done via /dev/mei. Until the release of processors, the ME was usually embedded into the motherboard's, following the (MCH) layout.
With the newer Intel architectures ( onwards), ME is included into the (PCH). Firmware. Management Engine (ME) - mainstream chipsets. Server Platform Services (SPS) - server.
Trusted Execution Engine (TXE) - tablet/mobile/low power Security Because AMT allows access to the PC below the OS level, security for the AMT features is a key concern. Security for communications between Intel AMT and the provisioning service and/or management console can be established in different ways depending on the network environment. Security can be established via certificates and keys (TLS public key infrastructure, or TLS-PKI), pre-shared keys , or administrator password. Security technologies that protect access to the AMT features are built into the hardware and firmware. As with other hardware-based features of AMT, the security technologies are active even if the PC is powered off, the OS is crashed, software agents are missing, or hardware (such as a hard drive or memory) has failed. Because the software that implements AMT exists outside of the operating system, it is not kept up-to-date by the operating system's normal update mechanism.
Security defects in the AMT software can therefore be particularly severe, as they will remain long after they have been discovered and become known to potential attackers. On May 15, 2017, Intel announced a critical vulnerability in AMT. According to the update 'The vulnerability could enable a network attacker to remotely gain access to business PCs or devices that use these technologies'. Intel announced partial availability of a firmware update to patch the vulnerability for some of the affected devices. Networking While some protocols for in-band remote management use a secured network communication channel (for example ), some other protocols are not secured. Thus some businesses have had to choose between having a or allowing IT to use without secure communications to maintain and service PCs.
Modern security technologies and hardware designs allow remote management even in more secure environments. For example, Intel AMT supports, (PXE),. All AMT features are available in a secure network environment. With Intel AMT in the secure network environment:. The network can verify the security posture of an AMT-enabled PC and the PC before the OS loads and before the PC is allowed access to the network. boot can be used while maintaining network security.
In other words, an IT administrator can use an existing PXE infrastructure in an, or network. Intel AMT can embed network security credentials in the hardware, via the Intel AMT Embedded and an AMT posture. The plug-in collects security posture information, such as configuration and security parameters from third-party software (such as and ), and protected.
The plug-in and trust agent can store the security profile(s) in AMT's protected, nonvolatile memory, which is not on the. Because AMT has an out-of-band communication channel, AMT can present the PC's security posture to the network even if the PC's OS or security software is compromised. Since AMT presents the posture out-of-band, the network can also the PC out-of-band, before the OS or applications load and before they try to access the network. If the security posture is not correct, a system administrator can push an update OOB (via Intel AMT) or reinstall critical security software before letting the PC access the network. Support for different security postures depends on the:. Support for and requires AMT version 2.6 or higher for laptops, and AMT version 3.0 or higher for desktop PCs.
Support for requires AMT version 4.0 or higher. Support for boot with full requires AMT version 3.2 or higher for desktop PCs.
Technology AMT includes several security schemes, technologies, and methodologies to secure access to the AMT features during and during remote management. AMT security technologies and methodologies include:., including. authentication. Single sign-on to Intel AMT with domain, based on and. Digitally signed. (PRNG) which generates session keys. Protected memory (not on the ) for critical system data, such as the, hardware asset information, and configuration settings.
(ACL) As with other aspects of Intel AMT, the security technologies and methodologies are built into the chipset. Known vulnerabilities and exploits. See also: Ring −3 rootkit A rootkit was demonstrated by Invisible Things Lab for the Q35 chipset; it does not work for the later Q45 chipset, as Intel implemented additional protections. The exploit worked by remapping the normally protected memory region (top 16 MB of RAM) reserved for the ME.
The ME rootkit could be installed regardless of whether the AMT is present or enabled on the system, as the chipset always contains the ARC ME coprocessor. (The '−3' designation was chosen because the ME coprocessor works even when the system is in the, thus it was considered a layer below the rootkits.
) For the vulnerable Q35 chipset, a ME-based rootkit was demonstrated by Patrick Stewin. Zero-touch provisioning Another security evaluation by Vassilios Ververis showed serious weaknesses in the GM45 chipset implementation.
In particular, it criticized AMT for transmitting unencrypted passwords in the SMB provisioning mode when the IDE redirection and Serial over LAN features are used. It also found that the 'zero touch' provisioning mode (ZTC) is still enabled even when the AMT appears to be disabled in BIOS. For about 60 euros, Ververis purchased from a certificate that is accepted by the ME firmware and allows remote 'zero touch' provisioning of (possibly unsuspecting) machines, which broadcast their HELLO packets to would-be configuration servers.
Silent Bob is Silent In May 2017, Intel confirmed that many computers with AMT have had an unpatched critical privilege-escalation vulnerability (-). The vulnerability, which was nicknamed ' is Silent' by the researchers who had reported it to Intel, affects numerous laptops, desktops and servers sold by, (later and ), Intel, and possibly others. Those researchers claimed that the bug affects systems made in 2010 or later.
Other reports claimed that the bug also affects systems made as long ago as 2008. The vulnerability was described as giving remote attackers: full control of affected machines, including the ability to read and modify everything. It can be used to install persistent malware (possibly in firmware), and read and modify any data.
Last weekend I decided that I wanted to try to set up a VPN server on my MacBook Pro running Snow Leopard 10.6.6. you may ask. A (VPN) is a type of Internet connection that allows users to establish a secure connection between a computer or a mobile device and a server.
The cool thing about the secure connection is that all traffic is 'tunneled' through a cryptographic system that makes it almost impossible (let's say very difficult) for hackers or people who want to take a peek at your Internet traffic to access your data. There are several implementations of VPN out there, but the main concept is that through a secure connection multiple computers and devices can stay on the same local 'virtual network'.
On the Mac As for OS X support of VPN, Apple (the one that will receive and handle incoming connections from computers and devices) only in the Server version of Snow Leopard. However, it's still possible to create a VPN server on the consumer version of OS X 10.6 with a bit of command line hacking or a third party application. While Snow Leopard Server offers an easy-to-use dedicated GUI for creating and managing VPN servers, the 'regular' Snow Leopard comes with the same vpnd system process that will handle all your incoming VPN connections. So: Snow Leopard Server and Snow Leopard have the same VPN functionality, but it's a bit harder to set up a VPN server on Snow Leopard. Why would I want to create a VPN server on my Mac, instead of subscribing to one of the hundreds of VPN services out there?
Good question. Indeed I am a subscriber, but the Mac VPN sever comes with a series of perks I was really interested in trying out: besides the secure connection, a VPN server running on your Mac allows you to remotely access your computer and attached drives (even network drives) as if you were on the same local network. To put it simply: even if your iPhone is on 3G, the Mac will 'see' it as a device on its local network.
Thanks to the VPN connection between the Mac and your iPhone or iPad (or why not, another computer) you'll be able to access a computer or external hard drive with the same local IP addresses you already know - those 192.168.x.x addresses you're likely using for Edovia's,. Once again: your iPhone isn't on the Mac's local network, but the VPN will let OS X think it is. This opens to a lot of remote computing possibilities I was curious to test, encrypted connection aside. First off, let me mention that having a secure, encrypted connection can come incredibly in handy if you connect to a lot of public, unsecured WiFi hotspots during the day and you're afraid someone using Firesheep or other network sniffing tools may intercept your traffic and steal your data.
It's not being paranoid, it's making sure our data is kept secure and private while using free, public WiFi. A VPN brings security, no matter if you subscribe to a paid service or set up a free server on your Mac.
If you're not interested in the remote computing options, I highly recommend anyway. Also, if you work in a corporate environment it's very likely that you're already familiar with VPN for secure access and emails.
The latest versions of iOS indeed come with, including VPN support. So how did I set up this VPN server on Snow Leopard?
After a bit of browsing and some suggestions I received on Twitter, I decided to follow to manually set up the server and put files in place to allow for incoming connections. Three hours later, the VPN server wasn't working and I couldn't connect from my iPhone at all.
So I went for the GUI approach and installed, a dead-simple application that with a few clicks lets you create a L2TP or PPTP server on Snow Leopard. Instead of manually editing.plist files and fixing permissions in the Terminal, all you have to do is choose the server type, type in account credentials and paste your personal Secret Key (you can generate a random one ). Make sure to pick start and end IP addresses (the ones your router will assign to the computer or device connecting remotely through VPN) and restart. On the next boot, the VPN server should be up and running on Snow Leopard, waiting for connections.
It runs in the background so you won't see anything on your desktop, but you'll notice a vpnd process in Activity Monitor and you can take a look at the server log with this Terminal command: tail -f /var/log/ppp/vpnd.log Notes While iVPN is very easy to use, I have a few observations to make: - I assigned a static IP address to my MacBook Pro and created a free global hostname so I can access my computer at any time, no matter the changes my ISP makes. My public IP at home is dynamic, it changes every few days, so the DynDNS background utility allows you to always connect with a personal address (something like stevejobs.dyndns.com) without having to worry about anything else. It's really great, and I use for a couple of additional apps as well; - Your ISP may be blocking some ports required by the VPN connection. Personally, I managed to make it all work by opening UDP ports 500, 1701 and 4500 on my router; - I'm using this VPN method with my iPhone 4 and iPad WiFi (connected through Personal Hotspot on the go) and it works; - If, for some reason, the VPN server stops working after a while (never happened to me), just restart your Mac. The VPN server process is always initiated at OS X boot; - iVPN is a paid app, so really think about whether you'd use a VPN server on your Mac before going ahead and purchase it. IOS That being said, connecting through an iOS device to the newly created VPN network is very easy: open the Settings app, navigate to General-Network-VPN and add a new configuration.
Choose L2TP or PPTP, enter a friendly name in the description (I set MacBook VPN), put your public IP address / DynDns hostname in the Server field, set account and password to the ones you chose in iVPN, leave RSA SecurID to 'off'. Enter the secret key and choose to 'send all traffic'.
This will make sure not only the direct connections to the Mac server but all web traffic is tunneled through the VPN. You may notice a decrease in speed while on 3G (due to data encryption), but otherwise on any other WiFi connection speed should be fine. Select the VPN, and slide the switch to 'on'.
A blue VPN icon will appear in the iOS status bar indicating that the connection was successful and you're now connected to your Mac server. Apps you can test With a Mac-iOS VPN connection going on, you might want to test a series of apps that take advantage of remote access to your machine to see how the whole 'iPhone virtually sitting in your local network' thing really works. For instance, I set up a single MacBook Pro configuration in Edovia Screens so I can access my computer's screen both locally and remotely with the same 192.168.1.8 IP address.
When I'm at home the iPhone is on the WiFi local network, while on the go I can fire up the VPN and access it with the same IP thanks to the tunneled connection to my Mac. The same applies for, an iPad app that with the VPN method explained above lets you log in your computer remotely as if it was on the same local network. Or again, Plex for media streaming, and for computer AND AirPort Disks access. Like I said, the possibilities are endless and it's up to you once you have an OS X VPN server to find the apps that might save you some precious time when remotely browsing your machine or external hard drives.
What it can't do Unfortunately, the VPN network I created doesn't let me use the new feature remotely. My guess is that Home Sharing is advertised on a local WiFi network as a Bonjour service, and Bonjour can't go through a VPN that easily. Hopefully someone will find a solution for this before Apple comes out with its own remote implementation. Wrap-up Creating a VPN server on your Snow Leopard machine is very simple with iVPN. While connecting with a computer or iOS device you'll end up with a pretty sweet way to access another computer, control it and stream media - plus you'll also have a secure encrypted connection so no one can take a peek at your data traffic. If you have ideas or suggestions for apps that can benefit from this tutorial, the comment section below is the right place to go.
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